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THE RECAST EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION: A MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY FOR RESTRUCTURING BUSINESS IN EUROPE 
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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to critically revisit the European Insolvency 
Regulation on the occasion of its recasting, in Regulation (EU) 2015/848, which enters into 
force, for the most part, in June 2017. The article first considers the circumstances underlying 
the Regulation’s adoption, highlighting the fact that a new approach to business failure has 
been an indispensable part of the EU’s response to the financial crisis, thus placing business 
rescue on the agenda. An endeavour to examine provisions purportedly targeted at creating a 
business rescue-friendly culture follows, including an attempt at an early appraisal of whether 
this objective will be achieved by these amendments. The Regulation is found to be a 
praiseworthy effort in upgrading the cross-border insolvency regime given the limited time 
frame and the fragility of the political status quo. Nonetheless, the Commission missed the 
opportunity to embark upon the quest of harmonisation to fully establish a rescue culture, 
despite the prevailing need to do so. For the time being the Regulation, being the culmination 
of complex review and sensitive compromise, remains a conflict of laws and jurisdiction 
Regulation. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The European Insolvency Regulation1 ‘arose like a phoenix’2 out of the ashes of the 
negotiations for a Bankruptcy Convention.3 It entered into force on 31 May 2002,4 having 
acquired the necessary political consensus. Ever since it has transformed cross-border 
insolvency within the European Union (‘EU’) from a fragmented and unpredictable state of 
affairs to a recognisable framework for proceedings opened in one of the member states 
(‘MS(s)’).5 It has even been capable of sometimes claiming an overseas effect.6 On 20 May 
2015, a recast version of the EIR was adopted by the European Parliament (‘Parliament’) and 
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1 This article refers to ‘EIR’ as the piece of European legislation purported to achieve cross-border insolvency 
cooperation across the EU. The terms ‘OR’ and ‘RR’, as later defined, will refer to the current and new version 
of the Regulation respectively. 
2 Richard Sheldon (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2015) [2.2]. 
3 Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs on the EU Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings (3rd edn, OUP 2016) vii, [1.01]–[1.23] for a historical overview; Manfred Balz, ‘The European 
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (1996) 70 ABLJ 485. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1. 
5 Bob Wessels, ‘Revision of the EU Insolvency Regulation: What Type of Facelift?’ (2011) <www.eir-
reform.eu/ uploads/papers/PAPER%205-1.pdf> accessed 20 February 2016. 
6 Gabriel Moss, ‘ECJ Takes Worldwide Jurisdiction Schmid v Hertel’ (2015) 28(1) Insolv Int 6. 
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the Council of European Union (‘Council’), namely Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (‘RR’),7 
constituting the culmination of complex review and sensitive compromise. 
Given the RR’s coming into effect in June 2017, the purpose of this article is to 
critically revisit the EIR, a milestone in the history of multinational arrangements for cross-
border insolvencies. This article does not seek to provide general instruction into the RR. 
Rather it focuses on one of its main aims, that of embracing and establishing a rescue-friendly 
culture, namely a social rather than economic approach to insolvency,8 which prioritises the 
preservation of viable commercial business as a going concern.9  
This characteristic is the main reason for dealing with this topic. While insolvency 
law has traditionally been one of the gloomier areas of law, this time the adoption of a 
binding, insolvency-related piece of legislation was accompanied by numerous studies and 
reports arguing for and declaring ‘a new approach to business failure’.10 This policy shift was 
mainly triggered by the fact that, while most corporate insolvencies presume that the business 
itself is not viable and aim at maximizing creditors’ returns,11 this was not always the case in 
the EU; the majority of debt-burdened companies struggling under over-leveraged balance 
sheets were forced to the brink of insolvency, despite being fundamentally viable. The 
Commission, acknowledging the devastating results of massive liquidations on the roadmap 
to economic recovery, shifted towards a rescue-friendly culture, by encouraging drastic 
response to business failure either by means of formal or informal proceedings, usually 
involving multilateral inter-creditor agreements, debt for equity swaps and injection of new 
financing.12 This article endeavours to examine whether this objective of creating a rescue-
friendly culture will be achieved by the latest amendments introduced in the RR. 
This attempt cannot take place in a vacuum. This analysis should take place within its 
appropriate context. Thus, section B sets the common understanding under which the RR was 
adopted, establishing that a recurring point in relevant official documents and reports is that 
an effective insolvency regime plays a key role in achieving the overarching aim of financial 
																																																						
7 Council Regulation (EC) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L41/19. 
8 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (1st edn, CUP 2010) 189. 
9 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the (Cork) Review Committee (Cmnd 8558 HMSO 1982) [198]. On 
different conceptions see Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves’ (2012) 32 LS 302. For 
the historical development see Insolvency Service, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction 
Mechanisms, Report by the Review Group, (DTI, 2000), [38ff]; Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2009) [1-039ff]. 
10 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee: A New European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency’ 
COM (2012) 742 final. 
11 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) [1.32]. 
12 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (n 8) 18. 
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rehabilitation within the European Economic Area, by alleviating debt overhang and non-
performing loans (‘NPLs’).13 Adopting a rescue-friendly policy was of pivotal importance to 
the post-crisis European agenda.14  
Section C will cast light on the amendments brought by the RR with particular regard 
to whether they managed to fulfil the Commission’s commitment to create a rescue-friendly 
regime. It will focus on issues such as the scope of the RR (C.2.a), the clarification of the 
Centre of Main Interests (‘COMI’) concept (C.2.b), the introduction of synthetic secondary 
proceedings and the refining of the relationship between main and secondary proceedings 
(C.2.c) and, finally, on proceedings regarding insolvencies of groups of companies (C.2.d). 
Provisions regarding the applicable law will not be examined, because they have largely not 
been reviewed to the same extent. Likewise, the provisions referring to publicity of the 
insolvency process will not be examined, since these focus on creditors’ protection rather 
than business rescue. Overall, it will be argued that there are some laudable improvements, 
either by way of clarification or introduction of certain innovations. Nonetheless, the RR 
seems to have fallen short of the Commission’s pursuit of comprehensive solutions. 
Finally, section D asserts that, despite having both the opportunity and the legislative 
tools to optimise the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency regime across the EU, the 
Commission did not seize the opportunity. As such, the RR remains a Regulation primarily 
focused on the questions of conflict of laws and jurisdiction whereas substantive 
harmonisation has only been attempted by way of ‘soft law’ tools. 
 
B. REVIEWING THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION: A 
STATUTORY DEMAND OR A COMPELLING REALITY? 
This section will establish that the RR has not been a mere bureaucratic exercise of 
compliance with article 46 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings (‘OR’); it has instead been part of the EU’s response to the latest financial 
turmoil. This response included shifting policy priorities and embracing a rescue-friendly 
insolvency regime. In the end, European institutional organs reached the same conclusion: 
																																																						
13 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment accompanying the document 
“Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency”’ SWD (2014) 61 final, 
24. 
14 COM (2012) 742 final (n 10) 3. 
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‘the more efficient the national insolvency systems, the better the internal market will 
function’.15 
1. The aftermath of the financial crisis 
The recent financial crisis revealed many structural challenges for the European economy. 
Firstly, it resulted in many MSs dealing with a legacy of high private sector debt.16 Secondly, 
the spillover effects of the crisis revealed the interdependence between the 28 national 
economies and urged for stronger fiscal consolidation and discipline.17 Thirdly, despite the 
single market ambition, businesses face persisting barriers to cross-border activity mostly due 
to the lack of a level playing field.18 
Despite the recession, the EU keeps moving towards the inauguration of a supervisory 
framework which would absorb inefficiencies and develop the necessary safeguards for a 
future shock.19 Financial recovery and sustainable growth were elevated to top priorities in 
Europe’s agenda with institutions launching a multileveled framework accompanied by a 
series of subsequent guidelines.20  
That a state’s economic performance and growth is also reliant on a well-functioning 
market is a matter so firmly established that it does not need further elaboration. Orderly 
functioning financial markets are in turn reliant on other factors, including robust underlying 
institutional frameworks. Judiciary integrity and legislative certainty, as well as the existence 
of special sets of rules and best practice can provide for competitive advantages and 
economic growth.21 This is why, in line with the growth strategy Europe 2020 and the recent 
Single Market Act II, justice has been put at the heart of Commission’s agenda as well.22  
																																																						
15 Paul Wright, ‘Challenges to the Harmonisation of Business Law: Domestic and Cross-border Insolvency’ 
2015 <ssrn.com/abstract=2658230> last accessed 19 March 2017. 
16 ‘Real GDP projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in the history of the EU […] 
public debt in the euro area is projected to reach 100% of GDP by 2014’ as cited Commission (EC) (2009a), 
‘Economic crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses’ (2009), DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs, European Economy 7/2009. 
17 Commission, Communication from the Commission ‘Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth’ COM (2010) 2020 final. 
18  ibid. 
19  ibid José Manuel Barroso’s preface statement. 
20 SWD (2014) 61 (n 13) 3; see indicatively Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council, ‘A European Economic Recovery Plan’ COM (2008) 800 final, launched in 2008 to restore 
market confidence, followed by Commission’s 2010 plan for EUROPE 2020 COM (2010) 2020 final (n 17) and 
initiatives such as the Single Market Strategy MEMO/15/5910 <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5910_en.htm> accessed 20 May 2016. 
21 Gerard McCormack, ‘Bankruptcy Forum Shopping: The UK and US as Venues of Choice for Foreign 
Companies’ (2014) 63(4) ICLQ 815; Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) Report, ‘Potential 
Economic Gains from Reforming Insolvency Law in Europe’ (February 2016) 
<www.afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/publications/afme-insolvency-reform-report-2016-english.pdf> 
accessed 22 February 2017. 
22 ‘Justice for Growth’, COM (2012) 742 final (n 10). 
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The insolvency and bankruptcy regime is one of the relevant institutional frameworks.23 
In that regard, it is noted that the European organs included the recast of the EIR to the 
judicial reforms as an indispensable part of the economic recovery programme.24 
2. Business insolvency regime as a key policy area for economic growth 
Business exit is nowadays an inherent process in the life cycle of companies, significantly 
affecting European economic life. Eurozone bankruptcy-related percentages have crossed the 
redlines afforded by developed economies,25 with theatrical headlines like the Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse drawing public attention. One quarter of these involve creditors or debtors 
in more than one MS.26 Although the momentum has slowed,27 the insolvency scene in 
Western Europe continues to reflect a recovering yet stagnating economy.  
Notwithstanding the scope of this article, the social repercussions are of relevance. 
Business failure has been a plague for employment with the total number of insolvency 
related job losses in Europe estimated at 5.1 million over three years.28 While statistics help 
us realize the extent of the problem, a brief explanation of how a revision of the EIR could 
contribute to alleviating these consequences follows. 
Almost all MSs share provisions for formal in-court proceedings; however, the options 
for restructuring and informal, hybrid proceedings are limited.29 Despite the praiseworthy 
efforts of some MSs of keeping in pace with new trends and approaches in business rescue, 
the availability of out-of-court and restructuring procedures across the EU is not of sufficient 
frequency across the board. Notwithstanding that a considerable amount of literature and 
research concludes that failed entrepreneurs that re-start show lower rates of failure and faster 
																																																						
23 Sergei A Davydenko and Julia R Franks, ‘Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, 
Germany and the UK’ (2008) 63(2) Journal of Finance 565. 
24 Council of the European Union, ‘Press Release, New Rules to Promote Economic Recovery’ (4 December 
2014) 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/?q=insolvency&frDt=&frDt_submit=&toDt=&toDt_submit=
&cc %5B%5D=610&stDt=20150722/> accessed 12 June 2016. 
25 Today in Europe about 50 percent of new businesses do not survive the first five years of their existence as 
cited in COM (2012) 742 final (n 10) 1; see also Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, ‘Report of the 
Expert Group: “A Second Chance for Entrepreneurs: Prevention of Bankruptcy, Simplification of Bankruptcy 
Procedures and Support for a Fresh Start”’ (January 2011)  
<ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10451/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native> accessed 10 June 
2016. 
26 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment 
accompanying the document “Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and 
Insolvency”’ SWD (2014) 62 final. 
27 Credit Reform Economic Research Unit, ‘Corporate Insolvencies in Europe 2014/15’ 
<www.creditreform.com/fileadmin/user_upload/CR-
International/local_documents/Analysen/Insolvencies_in_Europe_2014-15.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016. 
28  SWD (2014) 61 final (n 13) 2. 
29 Commission, ‘The Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery Frameworks in the EU’, European Economy 
Discussion Papers (September 2015) <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/> accessed 1 July 2016; 
SWD (2014) 62 final (n 23) 2. 
  36 
growth30 and although only 4-6% of bankruptcies are fraudulent, business failure is still not 
unanimously perceived as an opportunity for more reinvigorated entrepreneurship and 
business activity.31 Sustained by the lack of a framework addressing recognition and 
enforcement of this kind of proceedings,32 business rehabilitation is currently inflexible, time-
consuming, costly and value-destructive, with SMEs disproportionately bearing its effects.33 
Inefficiencies in national hybrid and insolvency procedures prevent deleveraging, delay 
loss recognition and impede credit flows to solvent corporations and individuals.34 As a 
result, this incomplete legal framework forces distressed but solvent firms into premature 
liquidation, adding to financial and social losses and ultimately undermines economic 
growth. 
An efficient insolvency regime is a catalyst for promoting and encouraging economic 
growth. The improvement and effective construction of an insolvency regime could 
encourage early and cost-effective rescue of viable businesses in order to avoid subsequent 
liquidation,35 also restricting the economic and social consequences of bankruptcy for 
entrepreneurs, provided that these business failures occurred in good faith.36 It would also 
mitigate the adverse legal consequences of personal insolvency and consequently promote 
entrepreneurship by providing for partial reassurance against the consequences of failure.37 
These advantages may also be felt on a larger, macroeconomic scale; an efficient insolvency 
regime fosters better ex ante assessment of the risks involved in lending and borrowing 
																																																						
30 Empirical studies show that a ‘forgiving’ bankruptcy law allows entrepreneurs to re-enter economy after a 
business failure. See inter alia Nicholas L Georgakopoulos, ‘Bankruptcy Law for Productivity’ [2002] Wake 
Forest Law Review 51; Augustin Landier, ‘Entrepreneurship and the Stigma of Failure’ 
<pages.stern.nyu.edu/~alandier/pdfs/stigma9.pdf> accessed 10 December 2015. For a challenge on the 
soundness of pursuing business rescue in every case see Horst Eidenmüller, ‘A New Framework for Business 
Restructuring in Europe: The EU Commission’s Proposals for a Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation 
and Beyond’ (March 2013) ECGI - Law Working Paper No 199/2013 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2230690> accessed 10 December 2015. 
31 Commission, ‘Report of the Expert Group’ (n 25). 
32 Commission, ‘Inception Impact Assessment on Initiative on Insolvency’ DG JUST (A1), 2016/JUST/025–
INSOLVENCY II <ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_just_025_insolvency_en.pdf>, accessed 
12 July 2016 acknowledging the disparity of insolvency legal systems in EU. The 2015 World Bank ‘Doing 
Business Report’ ranks countries on the strength of their insolvency frameworks. The EU is 5% below the 
OECD average for high income countries, while recovery rates vary between 30% in Croatia and Romania and 
90% in Belgium and Finland. In contrast, according to IMF Country Report No. 15/205, July 2015, US and 
Japan are making progress towards an efficient insolvency regime.  
33 Davydenko and Franks (n 23) 603–604. 
34 Commission, ‘The Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery Frameworks in the EU’ (n 29) 3. 
35 Simeon Djankov and others, ‘Debt Enforcement around the World’ (2008) 116(6) Journal of Political 
Economy 1105. 
36 Wei Fan and Michelle J White, ‘Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity’ (2003) 46 
Journal of Law and Economics 543. 
37 Thomas H Jackson, ‘The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law’ (1985) 98 Harvard LR 1393; Lee Seung-
Hyun and others, ‘Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: A Real Options Perspective’, (2007) 
32(1) Academy of Management Review 257. 
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decisions by creditors and businesses, leading to the overall healthier development of credit 
markets,38 as well as the deleveraging and reallocation of capital.39 Moreover, insolvency 
frameworks are crucial to smoothing out debt adjustment and minimizing the economic and 
social costs of the EU’s private debt overhang,40 since slow recognition of bad loans leads to 
upwards-drifting NPL rates and deteriorates the outcomes of deleveraging episodes, 
generating economic uncertainty. Therefore, insolvency regulatory frameworks have an 
indirect effect on the leveraging of entrepreneurship and consequently on economic growth.41 
Modernising and harmonising the EU’s insolvency rules to facilitate the survival of 
businesses and offering a second chance for entrepreneurs is a key policy area in the roadmap 
to improve the functioning of the internal market.42 The 2009 Stockholm Programme for the 
European area of justice,43 and other studies thereafter,44 highlighted the importance of 
efficient insolvency rules in supporting economic activity.45 
In conclusion, there exists a strong positive correlation between the availability of an 
effective insolvency framework providing for preventive restructuring solutions and high 
levels of entrepreneurship and economic growth across the EU. This is why the RR should be 
examined within the context of the EU's current agenda to promote economic recovery and 
sustainable growth, as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy for jobs and growth. 
3. The EU’s competence to act – a snapshot of the review process 
The global financial crisis brought temptations of economic nationalism resulting in signs of 
integration exhaustion and retreat regarding the single market objective.46 The Commission's 
vigilance and multileveled cooperation among MSs were indispensable in preventing a drift 
towards disintegration; legislative tools can contribute to that task. 
																																																						
38 Simeon Djankov and others, ‘Private Credit in 129 Countries’ (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 299. 
39 Commission, ‘Inception Impact Assessment on Initiative on Insolvency’ (n 32). 
40 IMF (2013b), ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Transition Challenges to Stability’ (October 2013); 
Commission, ‘The Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery Frameworks in the EU’ (n 29). 
41 See Joseph A Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, 
Interest, and the Business Cycle (Harvard Economic Studies 1934); Sander Wennekers and Roy Thurik, 
‘Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth’ (1999) 13 Small Business Economics 27. For an economic 
analysis in Europe see Commission, ‘Report of the Expert Group’ (n 25). 
42 COM (2012) 742 final (n 10). Although entrepreneurship and growth are not in a direct relationship, 
legislation aimed to facilitate entrepreneurship dynamics could, through the channels of increased competition, 
ultimately enhance economic growth. See further John Armour and Douglas Cumming, ‘Bankruptcy Law and 
Entrepreneurship’ (2008) 10(2) ALER 303. 
43 ‘The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’ [2010] OJ C 
115/1. 
44 AFME Report (n 21). 
45 According to AFME Report (n 21), applied across the economy this could add 0.3% to 0.55% to EU GDP 
over the long-term. 
46 COM (2010) 2020 (n 17). 
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As already established, the proper functioning of the internal market requires that 
insolvency proceedings operate efficiently and effectively. According to articles 81(2)(a), (c) 
and (f) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), judicial cooperation in 
civil matters falls within EU objectives; thus the EU is empowered to adopt measures 
‘particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market’ and concerned 
with the progressive establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.47 Moreover, 
article 81 TFEU does not prescribe a particular form for relevant measures, thus leaving the 
Commission with wide discretion on how to act, in compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.48 
In matters of cross-border insolvency, the way had already been paved by the OR. 
According to article 46 OR, the Commission ought to provide the Parliament, the Council 
and the Economic and Social Committee with a report on the application of the EIR no later 
than 1 June 2012 and every five years thereafter; this report should be accompanied by a 
proposal for adaptation, if necessary. 
The report was finally published in December 2012 and, in line with what had already 
been highlighted by the majority of the academic community and practitioners,49 it concluded 
that while the OR is functioning well in general and is ‘largely supported by stakeholders’,50 
there was a number of contentious areas identified that needed to be addressed.51 In addition, 
the persisting disparities between national insolvency laws together with the overwhelming 
changes in business reality that took place within ten years of EIR’s enforcement urged for its 
reappraisal.52 
Extensive tripartite discussions between the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council of Europe were held,53 with numerous proposals and large-scale studies.54 
																																																						
47 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (TFEU), 
Title V. 
48 ibid art 5. 
49 See Vanessa Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law', (2005) 68(5) MLR 713; Gabriel Moss and Christoph 
G Paulus, ‘The European Insolvency Regulation – the Case for Urgent Reform’ [2006] 1 Insolv Int 1; Gerard 
McCormack, ‘Reconstructuring European Insolvency Law – Putting in Place a New Paradigm’ (2010) 30(1) LS 
126. 
50 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 
on Insolvency Proceedings’ COM (2012) 743. 
51 ibid. 
52 COM (2012) 742 final (n 10). 
53 See Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs (n 3) [1.26]–[1.27]; Ian Fletcher, ‘The European Insolvency Regulation Recast: 
the Main Features of the New Law’ (2015) 28(7) Insolv Int 100; Michael Weiss, ‘Bridge Over Troubled Water: 
the Revised Insolvency Regulation’ (2015) 24 Int Insol Rev 192, 194. 
54 See for example Burkhard Hess and others, ‘External Evaluation of Regulation No. 1346/2000/EC on 
Insolvency Proceedings’ JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4 (Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna Report) 
<ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2016; Robert van Galen and 
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Ultimately, in an unusual display of unity, a consensus among the European institutions was 
reached, hailed by the Commission’s approval of a final draft of the RR in March 2015 and 
the Parliament’s support on 20 May 2015.55 Since the EIR was not completely changed and 
in view of further amendments in the future, the regulation was recast, incorporating thus ‘in 
a single text both the amendments that it makes to an earlier act and the unchanged provisions 
of that act’.56 
Fuelled by article 81 TFEU57 and reliant on its predecessor, the RR aims at 
modernizing cross-border insolvency cases by way of promoting economic recovery, setting 
an end date to the OR.58 Its legal basis forms part of the set goals59 and a basis for the RR’s 
interpretation and legal effects.60 As a Regulation, the RR claims for ‘general application’ 
and is ‘directly applicable’ in MSs and ‘binding in its entirety’, ie without transposition.61 
 
C. THE RECAST REGULATION: (R)EVOLUTION 
This section critically analyses the amendments brought by the RR, focusing on how and 
whether the new regime achieves the goal of a rescue-friendly strategy as promulgated by 
Commission’s official report.62 It is argued that the RR does not alter the insolvency 
landscape in its entirety; the outcome is a ‘text that is evolutionary, rather than 
revolutionary’.63 Especially when it comes to establishing a rescue-friendly regime, the 
solutions it provides are rather fragmentary, addressing isolated cases. 
1. General observations 
The net effect of the recasting is evidenced by the length of RR, which has almost doubled in 
size compared to the OR.64 This is to some extent due to the inclusion of a new chapter 
																																																																																																																																																																								
others, ‘Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation - Proposals by INSOL Europe’ <https://www.insol-
europe.org/technical-content/revision-of-the-european-insolvency-regulation-proposals-by-insol-europe> 
accessed 1 June 2016 (Robert van Galen Report); Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Report with 
recommendations to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law 
(2011/2006(INI)’ (Klaus-Heiner Lehne Report). 
55 Commission, ‘Insolvency: European Parliament backs Commission proposal to give viable businesses a 
‘second chance’’ MEMO/12/969 (5 February 2014) according to which Parliament has backed with an 
overwhelming majority (580 for) the Commission’s proposal to modernize rules on cross-border insolvency. 
56 Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for 
legal acts, OJ C 77/1, 28 March 2002 [2] 
57 RR, Recital 3. 
58 The OR will be replaced on 26 June 2017 according to Art 92 RR. 
59 RR, Recital 8, 81. 
60 Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs (n 3) [2.04], [2.20]; Miguel Virgos and Fransisco Garcimartin, The European 
Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International 2004) 7. 
61 TFEU, art 288; Virgos and Garcimartin (n 60) 4. Mutatis mutandis for the RR. 
62 COM (2012) 742 final (n 10); COM (2012) 743 (n 50) final. 
63 Fletcher (n 53) 105. 
64 ibid 100. 
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introducing provisions for coordinating group insolvencies. Equally remarkable is the 
replacement of some terms and the introduction of new ones; in a display of the change of 
mindset, the term ‘liquidator’ has been replaced by the more neutral ‘insolvency practitioner’ 
(‘IP’), while terms such as ‘hybrid proceedings’ and ‘undertaking’ denote a policy shift. 
Apart from that, there is a place reserved for basic notions such as ‘COMI’, 
‘establishment’, ‘main’ and ‘secondary’ proceedings. The core principles of the OR have 
been retained in the RR,65 since, according to the Commission’s report, the OR ‘is generally 
regarded as a successful instrument’.66 The RR seizes the opportunity to clarify contentious 
areas of interpretation,67 mainly by incorporating the fruits of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (‘CJEU’) jurisprudence with special consideration to EIR’s scope, forum 
shopping and the COMI concept, and to fit developments undergone by national insolvency 
laws into the EIR by embracing business restructuring.68  
Overall, the RR remains a private international law tool providing for conflict of laws 
rules and the allocation of jurisdiction.69 
2. Focusing on the RR 
a) Scope of the RR 
The scope of the EIR’s application is a significant principal consideration, both rationae 
materiae, namely which proceedings fall within the scope of the Regulation,70 and rationae 
personae, namely who can be considered a debtor.71 With the latter being relatively 
uncontroversial,72 the scope rationae materiae concerned the Commission. Relying on larger-
scale studies and public consultations, the Commission admitted that the OR reflects a 
traditional concept of insolvency73 that requires a lack of liquidity or a negative balance 
																																																						
65 ibid 101; Fransisco Garcimartin, ‘The EU Insolvency Regulation Recast: Scope and Rules on Jurisdiction’ 
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sheet, thus leaving aside developments in national insolvency laws.74 As a result, 
restructuring proceedings were not given recognition and enforcement across the EU, 
jeopardizing their success.75 There are limited cases that have managed to overcome such 
impediments, outreaching the bounds of the drafters’ wording which are attributable to 
national insolvency tools and manoeuvring.76 
The RR maintained the fundamental limitations already set by the OR. However, 
modernising the EIR in pursuit of sustainable growth77 required extending its scope of 
application.78 The change in the EU’s policy is visible in the redrafted article 1 RR, which 
along with Recital 10 proclaims a broader scope. By including pre-insolvency79 and hybrid 
proceedings,80 which were not initially covered by the OR, the RR attempts to encompass 
‘new trends and approaches’ in the MSs81 and aims at mitigating the problem of holding-out 
insolvency related proceedings. By bringing within its scope debtor-in-possession and interim 
proceedings82 as well as debt adjustment and reorganization, the RR seems to be openly 
embracing a rescue-friendly policy83 as part of the EU’s policy to give a second chance to 
both companies and individuals.84 
Another point addressed by the RR is the interplay between the criteria enshrined in 
the definition provided by article 1 and the listing of procedures in Annex A. The 
misalignment between the procedures listed in the annex and the conditions in article 1 OR 
resulted in the annex being over-inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time.85 The 
Commission, acknowledging the concerns raised by extensive studies and public 
consultations, admitted the problems and the legal uncertainty it created.86 This uncertainty, 
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though robustly circumvented by CJEU’s ruling87 – which held that the inclusion of a process 
in Annex A is conclusive evidence of it falling within the scope of the Regulation – needed to 
be clarified. 
The Annex mechanism is retained in the RR. However, a hierarchy has been 
provided, stating with admirable clarity in Recital 9 RR that proceedings falling within RR’s 
scope are listed exhaustively.88 Accordingly, Annex A has been updated and aligned with 
developments in MSs.89 
i)   Criticism 
Despite a detailed definition of the scope and the updated annex, which ultimately formalises 
the wider approach of the RR and declares a policy diverging from the stigma of 
insolvency,90 there is a lurking fear of increased complexity91 and ‘tightening’ of the scope 
which could lead to inflexible results which subvert the establishment of a rescue-friendly 
culture. 
This definition still spreads over articles 1 and 2 RR.92 Moreover, the ‘tightening’ 
effect is evidenced by a series of safeguards, such as the one in article 2(1), which confines 
its scope to proceedings affecting only the claims of involved creditors, excluding from its 
scope procedures that might entail a cramdown effect similar to the one in Chapter 11 US 
Bankruptcy Code. Another significant caveat is the fact that art 1 RR refers to public 
proceedings. This leaves confidential and unapproved conciliation procedures outside the 
scope of the RR, despite the fact that such proceedings are usually expeditious, less costly 
and available in many MSs.93 Equally controversial is the fact that the proceedings brought 
within the RR’s scope must be provided exclusively by insolvency law.94 This amendment 
may be counterproductive, resulting in MSs simply re-characterising insolvency procedures 
as company law procedures, thus excluding them from the RR. 
According to Recital 9 RR, the annex mechanism plays a triggering role. However, it 
does not list all national proceedings granting debt relief or debt restructuring, thus enabling 
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forum shopping on the part of individuals.95 Of greater concern is the fact that the annex can 
no longer be easily amended since article 45 OR has no equivalent in the RR.96 The 
proceedings to be listed in the annex is in MSs’ discretion and there is no longer any 
prescribed review process. This approach may put forum-shopping prevention goals at stake. 
Overall, the RR seems to be heading in two different directions, namely modernising 
the cross-border insolvency regime by adopting a broadened definition of insolvency 
proceedings, but also ensuring legal certainty by listing the type of procedures under the RR. 
The exhaustive listing solution freezes the status quo until the next review and risks the RR 
being outdated by the time it enters force. The result for the moment is that, while defining 
the scope was vital for the establishment of a rescue-friendly regime, the opportunity was not 
taken to fully embrace restructuring procedures across Europe. 
b) COMI concept and forum shopping 
In its report, the Commission affirms97 that the COMI concept holds a central role for 
allocating jurisdiction and for separating main from secondary proceedings. Meanwhile, it 
acknowledges the criticism COMI has attracted,98 mainly because of its variable and fact-
sensitive nature causing problems of interpretation and undermining creditor protection.99  
The most important drawback of COMI in the OR is its ambiguity, caused by the 
attempt to compromise between the ‘real seat’ and ‘incorporation’ theories, and its desire to 
bridge the gap between civil law and common law jurisdictions.100 The presumption of article 
3(1) is in favour of the latter, while the possibility of rebuttal favours the first. However, 
without any express definition101 or any guidance as to how the presumption is rebutted, 
creditors have to deal with uncertainties regarding the COMI of their debtors. In addition, 
COMI has been ‘an entirely artificial term without precedence’102 creating many problems in 
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interpretation. Despite the CJEU’s efforts to mitigate legal uncertainty with a series of 
judgments,103 its jurisprudence does not provide the needed clarifications. 
Due to its volatile nature, COMI has also been vulnerable to manipulation. Sustained 
by the lack of a level playing field among MSs, COMI offers debtors the possibility of 
legitimising their efforts to pursue an optimum regime by simply shifting their COMI and 
racing to the court to file for insolvency. Once the court is seized, it is granted unqualified 
recognition of jurisdiction. Consequently, it encourages opportunistic behaviour and forum 
shopping.  
Commentators proposed replacing COMI with the incorporation doctrine,104 since it 
provides for firmer results and accords with the principle of freedom of establishment in EU 
company law, as reaffirmed by the Centros, Überseeing and Inspire Art cases.105 
Nonetheless, according to the Commission’s findings, COMI enjoys general support.106 As a 
result, the RR maintains COMI’s key role as a master condition for the RR’s application.107 
The Commission’s choice is wise for three reasons: firstly, the COMI concept has surpassed 
EU’s frontiers by means of the UNCITRAL Model Law;108 secondly, there is evidence that 
the incorporation doctrine is equally vulnerable to forum shopping and manipulation;109 
thirdly, since jurisdiction is ascertained on the date of filing for insolvency proceedings, 
transferring COMI is feasible and does not contradict freedom of establishment, provided that 
third parties’ rights are effectively protected and that the COMI is readily ascertainable.110 
The Commission also responded to the other concerns raised. The RR includes 
measures and safeguards in order to foster legal certainty regarding the allocation of 
jurisdiction and the opening of proceedings on one hand, and preventing manipulation on the 
other. More specifically, by way of clarification, the RR takes advantage of CJEU’s 
meaningful case law, especially with regard to the ascertainability requirement,111 and 
provides for a definition of COMI112 applying equally to natural persons, without, however, 
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fundamentally deviating from its thrust.113 In the same vein, there is an innovation introduced 
by means of an express provision that COMI is fastened for a three-month period prior to 
filing a request to open proceedings.114 
Even more drastic are the safeguards introduced to curtail COMI manipulation and 
forum shopping; apart from recalling that forum shopping prevention is within its goals, the 
RR imposes on courts the duty to examine ex officio whether they share jurisdiction on the 
particular case and to specify the grounds of their jurisdiction.115 Furthermore, the RR 
introduces the opportunity to challenge a jurisdiction-related decision116 and addresses the 
unease caused by the race-to-the-court strategy of many distressed businesses. 
i)   Criticism 
The RR remains loyal to the COMI concept and purports at the same time to clarify 
ambiguities. Despite the Commission’s goals being clear, it is not clear that legal 
uncertainties have been eliminated. There are still some controversial elements. For instance, 
defining COMI clarifies and strengthens the presumption in favour of the place of registered 
office. Meanwhile, refining the presumption by means of incorporating in the RR 
guidelines117 when the presumption is to be rebutted, may result into it being exposed to 
manipulation and abuse.  
Setting aside the debate about COMI’s adequacy as a jurisdictional trigger and its 
alleged misalignment with the freedom of establishment, it is suggested that clarifying COMI 
was clearly not intended to be a priority among the initiatives towards a rescue-friendly 
regime. The text of the RR reflects that the main concern of the Commission was to prevent 
abusive forum shopping. 
 Consequently, the RR has tightened the COMI concept by introducing ascertainability 
and time-related safeguards in favour of creditors and third parties. It is the case that the 
incorporation theory or a more lenient choice of COMI could improve the chances for 
corporate rescue within the EU, since the debtor could simply increase the availability of 
restructuring options through ‘COMI shifting’. However, this time the balance has shifted in 
favour of creditor protection. 
 Nonetheless, legal certainty could by way of a side-effect contribute to creating 
conditions favourable to business rescue. Insolvency is a foreseeable risk for investors and a 
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major part of their decision-making process. Therefore, a forum that allows investors to plan 
and estimate cost can be attractive for accommodating new financing, even if the latter is 
channelled to insolvent companies. Similarly, it allows distressed companies to devise a 
rescue plan, without the fear of being subverted by adverse court decisions relocating the 
COMI of the company. After all, both the OR118 and the RR119 do not forbid shifting of 
COMIs, provided the decision is timely and protects creditors’ rights.120 
c) Secondary and synthetic proceedings 
Another drawback of the OR is the fact that secondary proceedings would have to be 
liquidation proceedings. This restriction, though irrational at first sight, was part of the 
‘horse-trading’ process121 in order for the EIR to gain the necessary political consensus by 
providing to MSs the possibility to ring-fence local creditors’ interests.122 Nowadays it 
reflects an obsolete perception of insolvency and prevents any pragmatic rescue-friendly 
compromise brokered by an IP, leading to forceful liquidation of other solvent subsidiaries.123 
Absent any objection mechanism and any specific duties for the liquidators to cooperate, the 
Commission admits that the opening of secondary proceedings has been abused by local 
creditors in an effort to ring-fence their claims.124 Besides that, the opening of secondary 
proceedings generally complicates the task of the IP in the main proceedings, since the IP 
needs to cooperate and bargain with other independent officers.  
The RR remains loyal to modified universalism125 as adopted by its predecessor and 
reserves a role for secondary proceedings by refining the prerequisites for opening them.126 
After all, the positive effects of these proceedings regarding local creditors’ protection should 
not be overlooked.127 Notwithstanding this, steps forward have been taken: firstly, the RR 
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removes the requirement of secondary proceedings being liquidations;128 secondly it gives 
power both to the courts129 and the IP130 to prevent the opening of secondary proceedings; 
thirdly, it introduces synthetic secondary proceedings.131  
The removal of the restriction on the nature of secondary proceedings is more than 
welcome; combined with the possibility to stay or object to the opening of secondary 
proceedings,132 the chances of a restructuring plan being approved in both jurisdictions are 
significantly increased. 
Regarding the synthetic secondary proceedings, the concept was first conceived by 
the English courts133 in an effort to minimize the disruptive effects of secondary proceedings. 
The IP appointed in the main proceedings undertakes a promise to respect local priorities, 
provided that they do not open secondary proceedings. This imaginative solution has been 
‘Europeanised’ thanks to the Commission’s initiative.134 Given the detailed framework, it 
could be the most value-maximizing tool of the RR and despite its clearly rescue-friendly 
orientated purpose, it is equally applicable to liquidation-type proceedings.135 
i)   Criticism 
It is submitted that the amendments on secondary proceedings in the RR’s provisions are 
sensible and timely, epitomising the Commission’s initiatives to adopt a rescue-friendly 
regime although, regrettably, the only promising one.  
Synthetic proceedings could be a powerful tool for the implementation of a 
restructuring plan, provided that it is matched with the IP’s expertise in business 
restructuring. Even prior to the required approval, an ‘undertaking’ may be used as a shield 
against the lodging of a claim to open secondary proceedings.136 Meanwhile, the RR provides 
for safeguards by enabling the creditors to ask the court for provisional and preventive 
measures.137 Another revolutionary feature of the ‘undertaking’ is that by virtue of its 
inclusion in the RR, it is automatically part of the applicable law of MSs bound by the 
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Regulation and overrides any contrary provision, creating an important exception to the 
national version of the pari passu principle.138 
However, the main drawback is that it is doubtful whether IPs coming from a forum 
unfamiliar with the procedure of undertakings would be willing to take advantage of this new 
tool. In addition, the vagueness regarding IPs’ liability and the legal consequences in the case 
of a breach could deter the appointment of IPs by the company, or the IPs themselves 
accepting appointments. Moreover, the approval of an undertaking is subject to creditors’ 
approval and to national law reservations,139 which could be used as a means of resistance by 
local creditors. Should an undertaking be disapproved, it will be up to the IP to resort to the 
alternative of objecting to the opening of secondary proceedings in defence of a unified 
approach towards the debtor's insolvency.  
Bound by a political concession to localism, the RR chose to implement 
‘undertakings’ to mitigate otherwise disruptive effects and overhauled the relationship 
between main and secondary proceedings. Unfortunately, this left a lot to be desired and 
given the questions raised in view of this innovation,140 it would be impossible to avoid 
interpretational calamities. A possible solution could be that the amendment be accompanied 
by its own rules, thus excluding external influences of applicable law.141 
d) Groups of companies 
The notion of ‘groups of companies’ (‘GoCs’) includes different forms of economic 
organisations, whose size, degree of integration, and structure may vary,142 requiring delicate 
legislative treatment. In addition to the disparity (or often absence) of rules treating GoCs, the 
separate legal personality doctrine prevents legislators from reaching a comprehensive 
approach, especially when it comes to insolvency. 
The OR does not contain any special provisions for GoCs’ insolvencies.143 However, 
reality of modern corporate groups could not be confined to the OR’s wording.144 Recent 
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group insolvencies145 that took advantage of partial and ad hoc solutions and achieved 
centralisation demonstrate the cost-saving and value-maximizing advantages of placing 
financially distressed corporate groups in a single location under the supervision of a single 
insolvency regime, thus avoiding the unpredictable application of uncoordinated 
approaches.146 However, such flexible solutions are limited to companies whose COMI is 
within the same state.147 The Eurofood case148 affirmed the basic premise of the OR:149 ‘one 
company, one insolvency, one proceeding’.150 Consequently, Eurofood considerably reduced 
the possibility of procedural consolidation.151 Although Interedil mitigated the latter stricter 
approach,152 it was not sufficient to overcome the registered office presumption. The absence 
of specific provisions for group insolvencies in the OR in addition to the lack of consistent 
interpretation, caused significant problems in practice,153 resulting in inadequate and unfair 
approaches by disappointing creditors’ expectations.154 In the context of restructuring in 
particular, the fragmented approach significantly hampers business rescue.155 Therefore, as 
the Commission admitted, the absence of any relative framework creates obstacles,156 
particularly when it comes to achieving a rescue-friendly regime. 
The RR filled the gap of its predecessor by introducing a definition for GoCs157 and 
specific provisions for GoCs insolvencies, wisely respecting the separate legal personality 
doctrine and the entity-by-entity approach expressed in Eurofood’s dictum.159 Accordingly, 
the RR provides neither for substantive consolidation158 nor for a main-secondary 
proceedings approach reflecting a parent-subsidiary relationship, since subsidiaries cannot be 
considered as ‘establishments’.159 It rather adopts a milder and more complex approach based 
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on two pillars: enhanced cooperation and communication on the one hand (arts 56–60 RR), 
and procedural coordination on the other (arts 61–70 RR). 
Specifically, the RR, clearly influenced by the UNCITRAL Guidelines, encourages 
cooperation and communication between IPs by means of protocols and risk allocation 
agreements.160 In the same vein, courts can take advantage of various tools and establish 
communication between them.161 Although belated compared to other ‘soft law’ 
instruments,162 it is worth mentioning that court communication and authority to act beyond 
their usual limits is for the first time backed by ‘hard law’ provisions. 
In addition, group coordination is introduced by means of a specific voluntary 
procedure.163 Notably, the RR acknowledges the possibility that the COMI of several 
companies of the group is in the same MS and allows for the same IP to be appointed.164 In 
all other cases, the RR offers to an appointed IP the possibility to file a group coordination 
request before any court competent to initiate insolvency proceedings for a member of the 
group in accordance with the local insolvency rules of the jurisdiction,165 and provides for a 
separate regime of priority rules and objections.166 Should the request be upheld, the RR 
introduces a new role, the ‘coordinator’, who is granted several rights and duties attributed to 
the position of a general administrator.167 
i) Criticism  
The introduction of provisions for group insolvencies is undoubtedly an improvement. 
However, being limited to matters of an administrative nature, it falls short of boosting a 
rescue-friendly regime.  
The main problem is that without any actual binding effect, group coordination is a 
‘blunt sword’.168 Although an explicit framework is finally set for cooperation and 
communication, it is subject to procedural limits and reservations169 in favour of the law of 
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the MS to which courts and IPs are subject,170 leaving room for recalcitrant jurisdictions to 
refuse cooperation.171 In the same manner, procedural coordination reliant on the IPs’ 
initiatives and a liberal opt-in mechanism does not effectively prevent IPs from ring-fencing 
local creditors at the cost of value-maximisation.172 It is submitted, however, that the 
‘comply-or-explain’ obligation set out in article 70(2) RR and the revocation mechanism 
provided in article 75 RR could deter any abuse of powers. Furthermore, the RR fails to 
clarify to what extent a court can scrutinise the appropriateness of a restructuring plan173 and 
does not address actions for disputes arising from the coordination.174 This uncertainty, along 
with the aforementioned points, could seriously hamper the restructuring of GoCs. 
This article argues that procedural coordination is the least interventionist and 
ambitious approach, protecting the Commission from exposure to the difficulties of 
substantive or procedural consolidation.175 It could be understood as an extrapolation of the 
cooperation principles governing the concept of main and secondary insolvency proceedings. 
Group insolvencies will probably not achieve meaningful outcomes, since they fail to mirror 
the reality of economically integrated groups and interrelated business activities.176 
Moreover, the complexity of the procedure adds to the overall cost. Given that the 
remuneration of the coordinator is calculated in accordance with the law of the MS in which 
coordination proceedings have been opened177 and borne by each member of the group 
proportionately, the reimbursement of the coordinator as well as the extra cost borne by each 
IP will probably constitute a deterrent for opening coordination proceedings. 
Although substantial consolidation has been almost unanimously rejected,178 
procedural consolidation is the nearest feasible alternative. It is much more resource-effective 
to align parallel proceedings by having the same individual in charge of them,179 besides also 
facilitating the implementation of a rescue plan. The difficulty of the task is not a convincing 
argument as to why the Commission restrained itself from such an initiative.180 In fact, the 
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RR explicitly dismissed any form of consolidation.181 The approach of procedural 
consolidation has probably been the outcome of compromise between Parliament and the 
Commission.182 
Generally, the new provisions are formalistic and fail to provide viable solutions with 
regards to group restructuring, despite a range of solutions being put forward.183 Taking into 
consideration the exclusion of horizontally integrated groups184 and the aforementioned 
concerns, the new provisions could be useful in limited cases and provided mutual respect of 
parties involved exists. In all other cases, opening group proceedings is of marginal value, 
since they only offer some leverage to the IP against the creditors with regard to the 
legitimacy of his decisions.185 
 
D. ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 
This section casts further light on the fact that RR is confined to maintaining the status quo, 
constituting a modest attempt towards establishing a rescue-friendly regime. For this purpose, 
the aim of harmonising insolvency law across the EU, which, although explored by the 
Commission as an option, did not make it through to the RR. The second part will refer to 
other steps that should have been taken to contribute to implementing business rescue more 
efficiently. 
1.  The golden thread: substantive harmonisation 
The failure of a company affects a wide range of interests, touching upon and drawing from 
many other areas of law.186 As a result, it attaches firmly to and pulls the strings of 
sovereignty and policy issues. On the other side, the recent financial crisis has demonstrated 
that national economies are members of one global arena and therefore increasingly 
interconnected.187 The spillover effects of an insolvent company cannot be restricted to and 
dealt with within geographical frontiers. However, even though there are some common 
fundamental elements of insolvency law, national attitudes are extremely diverse, particularly 
when it comes to the consequences for the distressed entity.188 Dealing with the overarching 
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aims of insolvency and the variability of interests and stakes surrounding an insolvent 
estate189 is a challenging task by itself, let alone when the creditors and assets are highly 
dispersed, involving more than one jurisdiction. The EIR recognises and respects the 
substantive diversity among national laws.190 In addition, the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality191 which call for limited intervention of the EU legislator, suggest a modest 
regime of certain procedural and substantive rules in private international law192 
The inefficiencies of this legislative choice minimise any potential benefits of the 
Commission’s efforts to establish a rescue-friendly regime. Parties’ opportunistic behaviour 
in searching for the most favourable forum to lodge their claims is sustained or even 
reinforced by the possibility of taking advantage of the gaps in the EIR.193 Consequently, 
MSs may continue to participate in this race to the court, and in an effort to ring-fence 
creditors’ claims, each state may claim competency over assets located in its territory.194 
When it comes to secured creditors and rights in rem in particular, immunity rules195 may 
contradict fairness and encourage stalemates that may ultimately jeopardise the outcome of a 
restructuring.196 
These conflicts are further enhanced by legislative competition among MSs.197 The 
disparities of substantive insolvency rules among MSs hamper the coordination of different 
proceedings. As a result, these hurdles make restructuring an excessively costly procedure, 
disproportionately burdening SMEs.198 The ensuing problems cause losses for both cross-
border creditors and debtors. 
This impact also takes place on a macroeconomic scale. Although insolvency is a 
foreseeable risk for investors, reservations in favour of national laws undermine certainty. 
This piecemeal regime could disincentivise financial institutions from investing in companies 
located in a MS199 in the first place and from supporting their rescue by providing new 
financing in the second. In addition, the absence of a uniform approach to discharging 
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distressed companies and offering an actual second chance leads to loss of entrepreneurship 
opportunities and maintenance of the debt overhang. 
Harmonisation of cross-border insolvencies would be of assistance to mitigate or even 
eliminate negative externalities produced by domestic legislation200 and create a level playing 
field.201 Therefore, it is a solution worth exploring and justifiable under the principle of 
subsidiarity, if insolvency is better regulated at the EU level.202 It needs to be emphasised that 
such an attempt cannot be isolated from the web of relationships and legal issues that exists. 
Underlying entrenched ideological differences deter harmonisation203 and if pursued too 
quickly and in an unstructured manner, could prove to be destabilising.204 
Despite the predicaments and difficulties of a harmonisation process, the Parliament, 
backed by INSOL’s support,205 was the first to engage with this alternative, concluding that 
there were certain areas of insolvency law conducive to harmonisation.206 According to this 
report, regulating the opening of insolvency proceedings, avoidance actions and liability of 
directors, and providing for uniform rules on termination of contracts, proposals for 
restructuring plans and insolvencies of GOCs is desirable and achievable. This could 
ultimately increase the efficiency of rescue procedures and the returns to creditors. It also 
implied that priority rules should be reconsidered. Unsurprisingly, however, the 
harmonisation of asset distribution rules, set-off and in rem rights were removed from the 
resolution.207 
The Commission embraced several of these points by highlighting certain areas of law 
where disparity could sabotage internal market.208 Meanwhile, the proposal to review the EIR 
was launched, accompanied by proposals to partially harmonise MSs’ insolvency regimes.209 
However, instead of incorporating these initiatives into the review proposals, the Commission 
surrendered prior to the political debate that would arise during negotiations. Having 
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overstated the lack of common ground,210 the Commission took a different route of a non-
binding ‘Recommendation’.211 Being more of a spontaneous response to the problems of 
surmounting NPLs and distressed companies, the Recommendation advocates for MSs to 
adopt best practice procedures by introducing, among others, debtor-in-possession and out-
of-court restructurings, cramming down mechanisms, discharge periods and moratoria. The 
Commission also invited MSs to review their existing restructuring proceedings or introduce 
new ones. 
Only 18 months after the Recommendation, the Commission published the evaluation 
of its implementation and admitted that it had not succeeded in facilitating the rescue of 
distressed businesses across the EU because of the absence of any substantial conformity by 
the MSs.212 Following this evaluation, and while awaiting for the RR to be implemented, the 
Commission again called for public consultation and commended an expert group towards to 
an initiative on insolvency.213 
In conclusion, despite the EU’s organs taking a positive view on the effects of 
increased harmonisation, the RR falls short of expectations and carries ‘the whiff of political 
compromise’.214 There is no convincing explanation as to why the Commission disregarded 
previous suggestions and reports. It is difficult to explain why the discrete areas conducive to 
substantial harmonisation, as previously identified, did not make it to the RR. By way of 
reasoning, the EU pointed out the calamities of this task. However, it would certainly not be 
the first time that the EU consolidated differing national laws. Apart from that, amendments 
could be achieved in a less interventionist manner, by means of introducing minimum 
standards and basic frameworks. Similarly, the ‘democratic deficit’ argument do not pardon 
the Commission’s idleness, since the consent needed could be given by means of article 294 
TFEU.215 
At this point, this article underlines that the RR is a missed opportunity with regard to 
harmonisation. The Commission’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach to promote harmonisation 
seems unreasonable, given the social and financial benefits that could have been obtained by 
a more radical approach.216 
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2. The devil is in the detail 
This section reflects briefly on amendments and clarifications that could have been made in 
order to optimise the business rescue culture. A number of these were part of the recasting 
agenda but did not make it to the final version of the RR. Although minor in relation to the 
quest for harmonisation, they could contribute to creating an EU rescue-friendly regime. 
More specifically, despite new financing being identified as one of the main features 
of an efficient restructuring procedure217 and the Commission’s recommendation that new 
financing agreed upon in a restructuring plan ‘should not be declared void, voidable or 
unenforceable’,218 there is a striking absence of an explicit reference as to how financing for 
distressed companies should be dealt with. This could lead to new financing being exposed to 
avoidance and claw-back actions, ultimately jeopardising the viability of a rescue plan. 
Another point is the granting of stays of proceedings and enforcement actions. The 
RR restricts itself by embracing temporary stays of proceedings within its scope and 
providing the IP with the possibility of requesting stays of proceedings or enforcement 
actions before the court.219 Although this step is welcome, important reservations apply, of 
which the most notable is the caveat for rights in rem.220 In addition, the heterogeneity of 
national law provisions regarding both the extent of the stay and the prerequisites of 
obtaining a stay221 does not guarantee that staying proceedings can solve stalemates and 
enhance the effectiveness of cross-border hybrid proceedings.222 Granting an automatic 
recognition of stay of proceedings across the MSs along with a minimum period of ‘breathing 
space’ could standardise procedures without impinging on matters of substantive law.223 
Despite not expressly incorporating UNCITRAL Model Law, the RR is clearly influenced 
by it, especially with regard to the definition of its scope. In line with it, the RR is now 
expressly confined to collective proceedings ‘based on laws relating to insolvency’;224 
accordingly, Recital 16 RR clarifies that the tools of ‘general company law that are not 
designated exclusively for insolvency situations’ are left outside the scope of the RR. This 
wording seems to exclude the English Schemes of Arrangement (‘SoAs’),225 the use of which 
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as a restructuring tool has witnessed a particular increase across Europe.226 Its versatility, 
however, leaves them outside the scope of the RR and they are deprived of automatic effect 
and recognition.  
This could be acknowledged as a victory for UK practitioners, who have lobbied hard to 
keep SoAs out of the RR’s scope,227 since inclusion of SoAs within the RR’s scope could 
further result in the creation of comparable procedures among MSs, which would undermine 
the UK’s attractiveness as Europe’s primary restructuring venue.228 Nonetheless, this outward 
victory for the lobbyists comes at a cost. Despite English courts’ discretion to sanction SoAs 
irrespective of the jurisdictional conditions set by the EIR, SoAs’ recognition is not 
guaranteed under Rome I229 nor under the Brussels Regulation (‘BR’).230 Particularly when it 
comes to the BR, views in English jurisprudence are conflicting and there is no appellate 
court decision reviewing the relevant case law.231 Despite current developments arguing for 
the recognition of SoAs under the BR, there is an important caveat,232 according to which the 
BR is ill-equipped to deal with the hybrid nature of SoAs. Uncertainty regarding recognition 
could ultimately lead to a court declining to sanction a SoA to avoid unfair results and to the 
loss of the contributions of SoAs in restructurings.233   
The case of SoAs further demonstrates that the lack of any reference to the interplay 
between the RR and the BR can only be interpreted as another missed opportunity for legal 
certainty. As acknowledged by the Commission, the delimitation between the two 
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Regulations is ‘one of the most controversial issues’.234 The incorporation of the Seagon v 
Deko case in article 6 RR, which now expressly confers jurisdiction for related actions, is 
welcome.235 However, it is submitted that it only alleviates the IPs’ task of navigating 
between two parallel set of rules,236 mainly by centralising the legal actions related to an 
insolvent estate. IPs will once again have to deal with issues of interpretation, such as the 
breadth of the term ‘actions deriving directly from insolvency’. On that matter, the CJEU has 
adopted a restrictive approach for insolvency matters.237 Nevertheless, regulatory overlaps 
and gaps have not been thoroughly eliminated. Recital 7 RR simply expresses a noble 
sentiment of avoiding regulatory loopholes, while conceding the possibility of gaps.238 The 
eventual text creates frictions, proving that absolute parallels cannot be maintained in 
practice.239 
E. CONCLUSION 
‘Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell.’240 
Τhis quote encapsulates the traditional concept of insolvency. An entrepreneur is either 
successful or he has failed and should therefore bear the consequences of a series of 
unfortunate events. The recent economic crisis proved that forceful liquidations and their 
spillover effects is a luxury no longer afforded in the roadmap towards economic growth. 
Thus, in order to retain the pool of entrepreneurs in the economy, it is essential to adopt a 
business rescue approach by scrutinising existing insolvency regimes. The EU purported to 
align with this ‘reforming mania’ by way of a timely recast of the EIR. 
Although the real impact of this recast is to be observed in the future and depends on 
a number of factors, this article attempted an early review of the RR based on its provisions. 
It concludes that the outcome has not been as far-reaching as the language of the 
Commission’s proposals implied. While the RR is a step forward, it does not go down the 
road of harmonisation; it remains a jurisdiction and conflict of laws regulation and it only 
partially alleviates the negative externalities of restructurings. It does this by codifying the 
																																																						
234 COM (2012) 743 final (n 54) 10. 
235 Case C-339/07 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] All ER (D) 112 supported also by the travaux 
préparatoires, namely: VS Report (n 149); Peter Schlosser, ‘Schlosser Report No C 59/71 ‘ (1978) Official 
Journal of the European Communities <http://aei.pitt.edu/1467/1/commercial_reports_schlosser_C_59_79.pdf> 
last accessed 27 March 2017. 
236 McCormack (n 69) 135. 
237 Case C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH [2009] ECR I-08421. 
238 McCormack (n 69) 136; Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs (n 3) 53. 
239 Geert van Calster, European Private International Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) [5.4.5]. 
240 Frank Borman (1928–), astronaut, former Chairman, CEO of Eastern Airlines, a major American airline from 
1926 to 1991 that filed for Chapter 11 and was dissolved. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.078 
	
 59 
CJEU’s jurisprudence coupled with a meagre attempt at some innovations. In the end, 
entrepreneurs and companies may ultimately not be granted the much-desired second chance 
to ‘paradise’. In conclusion, it is argued that the RR falls short of overturning the traditional 
approach to insolvency matters. Sustained by the disparity of national insolvency legislation, 
it is an ambitious yet modest attempt for an efficient and rescue-friendly EU insolvency 
regime. 
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